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NOTES

Mental Suffering- Abolition of the Traditional
Zone of Danger
Plaintiff witnessed defendant's negligently operated automobile fatally
strike her infant daughter. A second daughter also witnessed the accident.
Plaintiff brought actions on behalf of herself and the second daughter for
emotional disturbance, shock, and injury to the nervous system causing
great physical and mental pain and suffering. The trial court granted
summary judgment against the mother because she was outside the zone
of physical danger, but denied it against the daughter because there was
a fact question as to whether she was within the zone of physical danger.'
Held, reversed: A mother may recover for shock caused by witnessing the
death of her child resulting from another's negligence, even though the
mother is not physically endangered by the defendant's act. Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
I.

THE BYSTANDER-PLAINTIFF AND RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING

While courts generally have been reluctant to allow compensation for
any type of mental suffering,' they have been particularly hesitant to allow recovery for the mental suffering of a "bystander-plaintiff" (i.e., one
who is not directly injured by the defendant's act, but who suffers injury
as a consequence of witnessing an act of the defendants that places another in peril or causes harm to another). Courts are loath to allow recovery because the area of mental suffering is relatively uncharted, thereby inviting a host of fraudulent claims. When the plaintiff is a bystander,
the possibility of fraud is intensified. Nevertheless, recovery has been
granted in a limited number of cases where the bystander witnessed an
intentional tort and as a consequence suffered physical injury. In such
cases, the courts generally rely upon the concept of transferred intent to
impose liability.'
It is more difficult for a bystander-plaintiff to recover when his mental
distress is caused by the defendant's negligent act. As in all negligence
cases, the doctrine of foreseeability is employed to determine whether the
'The declaration of one McKinley disclosed the plaintiff testified in her deposition that when
she saw the car rolling over decedent, she noted her other daughter was on the curb, but the
deposition of the daughter contradicts such statements.
'Mental pain was deemed to be something the law could not value or "pretend to redress."
Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 511, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861). Eventually in cases allowing recovery for mental suffering, compensation was limited to parasitic damages to insure the authenticity of the alleged tort. For discussion, see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OIr
TORTS 55 (3d ed. 1964); MAGRUDER, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1936). Later courts allowed compensation for mental suffering
alone in cases where defendant was charged with outrageous intentional infliction of mental distress. See Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) (plaintiff was falsely led to believe
that her child had been critically injured); Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240
P.2d 282 (1952) (creditor harassment); Nickerson v. Hodge, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920)
(practical jokers led plaintiff to believe pot of dirt was pot of gold thereby causing her to suffer
immense embarrassment).
'The act of defesdant may be negligent or intentional.
"E.g., Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890), where a pregnant woman saw the
defendant commit an assault and battery and, as a consequence, suffered a miscarriage.
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defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care.' Use of this vague doctrine in
the already muddled area of mental suffering has made it particularly
difficult for courts to administer justice. To lessen the difficulty, and because of the policy against compensation of mental suffering, courts have
placed artificial limits on the duty owed to the bystander-plaintiff.
Courts first demanded that the bystander-plaintiff's mental pain be accompanied by some "impact"' upon his person. Later, some courts dropped the requirement of impact 7 and, instead, measured foreseeability by
determining whether the bystander-plaintiff was so situated at the time of
the accident that his physical safety was actually, or was believed by him
to be, endangered as a result of the defendant's negligence.! If a plaintiff
was so situated, he was within the "zone of ordinary physical danger"'
and could recover. °
American courts"1 have almost uniformly" refused to extend the "zone
of danger" theory to encompass the situation where a plaintiff, not himself physically endangered by the defendant's act, suffers injury because
of distress at peril or harm negligently inflicted upon another.a The rea,"Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be
liability; it necessarily begs the essential question. . . . In the decision whether or not there is a
duty, many factors interplay, the hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administering the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall." Prosser,
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953).
0"'Impact" is not used to denote physical injury inflicted directly by defendant, but physical
injury sustained indirectly as a result of fright caused from defendant's act. See Cosgrove v.
Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958)
(not a bystander-plaintiff situation). Justice Musmanno registering a blistering dissent to the impact rule. Id. at 267. The impact rule is in effect in Texas. See Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154
Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
At least the following states allow recovery in mental suffering cases without the requirement
of physical impact: Colorado, Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965); California, Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 58, 92 P.2d 434 (1939); Maryland, Resavage v. Davies, 199
Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); New York, Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,
219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
8Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941).
'Id., "Where it is proven that negligence proximately caused fright or shock in one who is
within the range of ordinary physical danger from negligence, and this in turn produced injuries
such as would be elements of danger had a bodily injury been suffered, the injured party is entitled to recover." (Emphasis added.)
"oIt is reasonable to argue that if the plaintiff is threatened with physical injury (i.e., is within the zone of danger), but suffers
a mental rather than a physical injury, she can recover as she
was a foreseeable plaintiff and it is merely a matter of the unexpected manner in which the harm
occurred. W. PROSSER, THE LAW os' TORTS 353 (3d ed. 1964).
"t British and Australian courts have allowed recovery. King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429
(rejected zone of physical danger as limit of foreseeability, stating relevant area was one of emotional shock, not physical danger and not necessarily fear for self); Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.,
[1925] 1 K.B. 141; Richards v. Baker, [1943] S. Austl. 245 (father recovered for shock of
seeing infant child injured).
" Exceptions have been made in the area of public carriers to whom the law ascribes a higher
duty to exercise care. Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906),
error ref.
"3 Illustrative cases denying recovery include the following: Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing
Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (D. Ark. 1959) (applying Arkansas law) (witnessed father crushed by
tractor trailer); Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957) (wife witnessed husband killed in car accident) ; Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (mother
watched building burn knowing son was trapped in it and suffered mental breakdown as a result);
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900) (saw daughter
dragged by train); Knaub v. Gatwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966) (saw son impaled on
iron fence picket); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods., 182 Wash. 578, 49 P.2d 1037 (1935)
(saw
offspring in path of runaway truck). Recovery also denied in Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn.
714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Resavage v.
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soning of the courts is exemplified by the California case of Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co." In Amaya a pregnant mother not physically endangered sought recovery for emotional shock and fright allegedly
induced by witnessing her infant son struck by the defendant's negligently operated truck. In denying recovery, the court emphasized its inability to determine the stopping point of liability and the consequent
difficulty of administering justice if the traditional zone of danger approach were abandoned.15
II.

DILLON v. LEGG:

A

NEW TEST FOR BYSTANDER RECOVERY

In Dillon" the California supreme court took issue with the use of the
traditional zone of physical danger rule to define the duty of care owed to
a bystander-plaintiff. The court concluded that the policy reasons for the
rule (i.e., fear of fraud and administrative difficulties) were inadequate
reasons for denying recovery for emotional shock occasioned by fear for
another. The majority felt that the facts of Dillon exposed the "hopeless
artificiality"'" of the traditional rule by contrasting the claim of a mother
who admittedly was not within the zone of physical danger with the claim
of the sister who may have been within that zone. Although at the time
of the accident the mother and daughter were separated only by a few
feet, application of the zone of physical danger rule made recovery possible for the daughter" and impossible for the mother. The court refused
to "draw a line between the plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of
physical impact and the plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of emotional impact."" Consequently, the court overruled Amaya and held that
the zone of danger could not be restricted to the area of those exposed
only to physical injury,"° but must encompass the area of those exposed
to emotional injury as well.
The following general guidelines were proposed in Dillon to aid in
determining whether the plaintiff is within the zone of foreseeability, that
is, the zone of emotional danger. The plaintiff (1) must be located near
the accident scene, (2) must witness the accident, and (3) must be a
close relative of the victim. Applying these guidelines to Dillon, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had alleged a prima facie case. Because the
Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Carey v. Pure Distrib. Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124
S.W.2d 847 (1939); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).
'459 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 913, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). Amaya cited Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), to support its reasoning in denying recovery. Dillon
refuted Waube, stating fear of fraud and administrative difficulties to be an insufficient ground
for denying recovery.
"5This fear is expressed in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
"'Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
"' Id. at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
"It is here assumed that the daughter if found to be within the zone of danger would be
allowed to recover. This suit was collateral to the mother's suit, and the main opinion gives no
indication of its outcome.
"'Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 n.5, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 n.5 (1968).
"The California court in Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918), had allowed
a mother to recover only because she was physically endangered. Parasitic damages were allowed
for mental suffering caused by fear for her children. (Mother fought ape off after it had
attacked children.)
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victim was a young child, the defendant could reasonably expect the
mother to be nearby and to suffer emotional trauma upon witnessing the
accident. 1 Since the possibility of harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable,
the defendant owed her a duty of care. Having failed in the exercise of
that duty, he was negligent to the mother and, therefore, liable for damages.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF DILLON

In Dillon the dissent accused the majority of embarking "into the 'fantastic realm of infinite liability.' ....
Indeed, the three "guidelines" delineated by the majority are difficult to apply. First, the majority requires
that the plaintiff must be located "near" the accident; but how near the
plaintiff must be is unresolved. Secondly, the plaintiff must witness the
accident; but the opinion does not indicate exactly what the plaintiff
must witness. Thus, it is questionable whether a mother who hears the
noise of impact, or witnesses only the aftermath of the accident, either directly or by having her injured child' or husband"' brought to her door,
can recover. Thirdly, the court did not specify how closely related the
plaintiff and accident victim must be.' It is interesting to speculate whether mental suffering would be compensable if the plaintiff had been decedent's stepmother, adopted mother, foster mother, or even an aunt who
had reared her from birth.
It is also interesting to note that the California court couched its holding in terms of physical, rather than emotional, injury. The key to reconciling this statement with the outcome reached by the court in Dillon
is the definition of physical injury. Most courts seem to define physical injury in terms of actual physical harm, i.e., miscarriage," fainting, 7 or falling. 8 But California has included in this category injuries basically men"The court cited W. PRossrR, TisE LAW Or TORTS 353 (3d ed. 1964) and F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, TisE LAW OF TORTS 1039 (1956) in support of its holding.
2 441 P.2d 912, 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 86 (1968) (Burke, J.). See also Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
"Recovery was denied in this situation in Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950).
4 This situation was present in Price v. Yellow Pine Paper Mill, 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922) (Recovery was allowed because husband had told defendant not to take him home as
shock of his condition might cause injury to his pregnant wife. The court treated this as an
intentional tort.)
" The caveat to RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965) comments upon defendant's
liability to an unrelated bystander. It is to be noted, however, that it is couched in terms of
bodily harm. The pertinent sections of § 436 and the caveat are as follows:
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk causing
bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other
similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely
from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect
the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the other
results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate
family occurring in his presence.
Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated in Subsection (2) may apply where bodily harm to the other results from his shock or
fright at harm or peril to a third person who is not a member of his immediate
family, or where the harm or peril does not occur in his presence.
26Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
"7Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238, 105 N.E. 975 (1914).
5"Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914).

